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The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) -  
Political rationale and functioning  
The FOCAC meeting is dominated by economic topics, but 
China‘s engagement in Africa has retained some of the 
political elements and motivations that were at the 
beginning of the relationship. FOCAC much resembles 
institutions such as the Franco-African Summit, the 
Commonwealth Conference or the Tokyo International 
Conference of African Development (TICAD). A sense of 
Chinese competition with Western powers can thus be 
assumed in the establishment of the forum – and has driven 
other emerging powers like India and Turkey to establish 
high-level meetings with African officials, too. Even if 
predominantly driven by the continuous supply of raw 
materials from and market access to African countries, the 
FOCAC relationship continues to have a strong political 
dimension beyond its public relations value. 
Institutionalisation of relations with Africa as a 
challenge for Beijing 
Despite continuity in rhetoric, China‘s relations with African 
states have undergone cycles (see box 1). The currently 
dominant economic rationale has also had a strong political 
element throughout. Policies paved the way for globalisation 
of Chinese business – and increasingly, China has become a 
political actor abroad. In the late 1990s, some countries 
(including Ethiopia, Mauritius and Madagascar) pushed for a 
joint exchange of China and Africa as a group. A high 
degree of institutionalisation in the asymmetric relationship 
between a continent and a country was initially met with 
scepticism in Beijing. China traditionally prefers bilateral 
relations and its policy thrust is towards more global multi-
polarity, rather than multilateralism. The understanding of 
multilateralism is often limited to joint summits, albeit 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 
changed this slightly. Yet, relatively little institutionalisation 
is usually aspired toward. After a broadening of China‘s 
international relations in the late 1990s, the year 2000 saw 
the political situation in Beijing offering an opportunity to 
institutionally upgrade its Africa relations; suggestions from 
Africa met a more receptive environment, resulting in a first 
FOCAC meeting in Beijing.  
The ministerial meeting in Beijing in October 2000 was part 
of China‘s strategic foreign policy towards Africa to secure 
its diplomatic and economic interests and position herself in 
the global political and economic order. Amongst the goals 
formulated for the first meeting was the treating of each 
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member state as an equal and respecting each other‘s 
sovereignty and not interfering in each other‘s internal 
affairs, as well as seeking mutual development and 
enhancing consultation and cooperation in international 
affairs. 
Since then, ministerial meetings have been organised in 
Addis Ababa (2003), Beijing (2006) and Sharm-el-Sheikh 
(2009). FOCAC III, held in Beijing, has received most public 
attention; it was the first meeting held as a full-fledged 
China-Africa summit. African presidents and heads of state, 
high-level representatives from 48 countries as well as 
entrepreneurs attended the FOCAC summit in Beijing in 
November 2006. Well before this meeting, in January 2006, 
Beijing published a policy paper called China Africa Policy, 
symbolically underlining a long-term interest in Africa.  
From the Chinese side, the debate is more centred on an 
economic, diplomatic and political framework relying on 
South-South cooperation. Declarations after summits are a 
key diplomatic tool in international relations. Like other 
summit declarations, these documents list all points of 
agreement and assess the situation between the actors. 
Resulting joint actions are put under action plans to provide 
guidelines for projects financing and implementation. Action 
plans are also offering opportunities to announce a number 
of measures to be taken in relation to each FOCAC meeting 
(see table 1).  
Weak follow-up mechanisms for FOCAC  
Only China, South Africa and Ethiopia have some 
institutional mechanisms for monitoring progress and further 
planning. In most other cases, such decision-making occurs 
on an ad hoc basis. The African diplomatic corps in Beijing is 
coordinated by the longest serving Ambassador from Africa 
and thus highly dependent on personality. Regional 
organisations – such as the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) or the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) - offer some framework for 
coordination amongst diplomats in Beijing. The degree of 
coordination and internal cohesion within regional 
frameworks varies substantially, though.  
A Chinese Follow-up Committee of FOCAC is located in the 
Africa Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
needs to coordinate with the Department of West Asian and 
Africa in the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), where for 
instance the Department of Foreign Aid is located. Also 
involved is the Chinese Ministry of Finance. China EXIM Bank 
is responsible for implementation of projects, including 
feasibility studies. The Chinese bank has a veto right on 
projects in the light of its own regulations, which include 
funding procedures and environmental regulations. The 
Chinese Follow-up Committee holds meetings with the 
African diplomatic corps every two to three months. 
Consequently, projects and their implementation are mostly 
driven by Chinese institutions.  
The African side appears to be mostly reactive to Chinese 
proposals, including draft Action Plans for the triennial FOCAC 
meetings. Civil society organisations are not systematically 
included in any of the committees; FOCAC relations are state-
to-state interactions. Sino-African engagement at regional or 
continental policy level is limited. The African Union 
Commission became a full FOCAC member in 2010 and has 
benefitted from the highly symbolic donation of a headquarter 
building entirely funded by the Chinese government. Yet, cross
-country infrastructure or direct assistance to African regional 
organisations does not feature high on the FOCAC agenda 
thus far. 
China has gained a reputation for sticking to commitments 
made during FOCAC (see the CCS research report on FOCAC, 
published 2010). This adds to the tangible disillusionment 
many African elites already have in European institutions and 
their promises. However, implementation is sometimes 
unexpectedly slow. One such case is the setting-up of 
(functioning) special economic zones, of which only one – in 
Zambia – is fully operational at the time of writing. Others, like 
in Mauritius, have set up the infrastructure, but still await 
Chinese investors. Also, the China-Africa Development Fund 
(CADFund) reportedly finds it difficult to attribute its funding 
to sufficient numbers of projects across the continent. 
FOCAC V in Beijing 2012: change of leadership 
and the next level of reforms 
While the biggest and most eye-catching event was the 
summit in Beijing in 2006, the summit in Sharm el Sheikh in 
2009 was a more down-toned event. This might have been an 
effect of the financial crisis, and also prevented the racing to 
ever-bigger commitments on the Chinese side. This could have 
been triggered by outside criticism about insufficient clarity on 
underlying concepts when making commitments, such as 
‗doubling aid‘ when the Chinese understanding of what 
constitutes aid was only officially defined by the China Aid 
Policy in 2011. It will, however, also have been a reaction to 
ever-rising expectations on the African side, which increasingly 
turn to China for help and attention. These requests are hardly 
ever based on an analysis of China‘s political will and capacity 
and thus are often unrealistic. Given the persisting needs and 
political tensions in China, Beijing‘s attention rests 
predominantly on issues of domestic development.    
FOCAC was inaugurated under Chinese President Jiang Zemin. 
It was, however, shaped by President Hu Jintao and Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao, both of whom came into leadership 
functions in 2002. Both will leave their party functions in 
October 2012 and their state functions in March 2013.  
In March 2012, premier Wen Jiabao‘s speech at the National 
People‘s Congress centred on urgent political and economic 
  




reforms. He claimed that gradual and orderly reforms are 
essential for China and that such reforms will involve a 
series of challenges if one considers the leadership transition 
that will occur in China in March 2013. New appointments at 
China‘s Politburo Standing Committee and the end of Hu 
Jintao‘s term will lead to more internal and external changes 
respectively within China and in China‘s political, economic 
and diplomatic relationship with its partner countries, African 
countries included. China can be expected to face mounting 
challenges in the years to come – and consequently Beijing 
is likely to turn increasingly towards domestic challenges 
first, despite rising investment levels in Africa.  
Conclusions  
While China has clear programmes for the FOCAC 
meetings, Africa – consisting of 54 states, of which 50 
have diplomatic relations with Beijing – has a structural 
disadvantage and cannot present one detailed agenda vis-
à-vis Beijing. While outcomes are of paramount 
importance, multilateral settings nevertheless require a 
functioning process. The FOCAC follow-up is far less 
institutionalised and mostly driven bilaterally; there is no 
joint secretariat or other monitoring entity. Coordination 
thus is ad hoc with African diplomatic missions in Beijing 
and through the Chinese embassies in African countries.  
Assessing China’s Role in Foreign Direct  
Investment in Southern Africa 
March 2011 
November 2011  
May 2012 
Table 1: Overview of commitments made during FOCAC meetings. 
FOCAC I (2000) FOCAC II (2003) FOCAC III (2006) FOCAC IV (2009) 
 Financial commitments 
Debt cancellation of up to RMB 
10 billion for the HIPC and LDC 
countries in Africa within 2 
years. 
Trade and investment 
▪ give preference to import of 
African products ―in the light of 
demands and conditions of the 
Chinese market‖ 
▪ ensure operation of Invest-
ment and Trade Promotion 
Centres by China in Africa and 
assist African states to set up 
similar entities in China. 
▪ establish a China-Africa Joint 
Business Council 
▪ create a China-Africa Prod-
ucts Exhibition Centre in China 
▪ China will provide special 
funds to support Chinese in-
vestments in Africa 
Capacity building 
▪ send additional medical 
teams to Africa, including 
equipment, in order to train 
local medical staff. 
▪ establish an African Human 
Resources Development Fund 
(AHRDF) 
Environmental cooperation 
In areas including pollution 
control, biodiversity conserva-
tion, protection of forests, 
fisheries and wildlife manage-
ment. 
 Financial commitments 
China will continue to in-
crease assistance for Afri-
can countries (no figures 
provided) 
  
Trade and investment 
China will grant tariff-free 
access to some commodi-
ties from LDCs 
  
Capacity building 
China will train up to 10,000 
African personnel in various 
fields within 3 years 
  
Cultural cooperation 
▪ China will sponsor an art 
festival focussing on African 
arts and a Chinese cultural 
presentation in Africa. 
▪ China will hold a China-
Africa Youth Festival in 
China in 2004. 
  
Other 
China will grant Approved 
(Tourism) Destination Sta-
tus to eight African coun-
tries for Chinese citizens 
who cover their own ex-
penses. 
 Financial commitments 
▪ Double aid to Africa by 2009 (2006 
as benchmark year) 
▪ provide US$ 3 billion as preferential 
loans US$ 2 billion as preferential 
buyer‘s credits within 3 years 
▪ provide RMB 300 million (ca. US$ 
40 million) for artemisin (anti-malaria 
drug), 
▪ Cancel government debt; namely: 
matured interest-free loans due in 
2005 owed by HIPC and LDCs. 
Trade and investment 
▪ set up the China-Africa Develop-
ment Fund (CADFund), an invest-
ment fund with US$ 5 billion capital 
▪ increase the number of zero-tariff 
export items from 190 to 440 for the 
30 least developed African countries 
▪ establish 3 to 5 trade and economic 
cooperation zones in Africa within 3 
years. 
Capacity building 
Within 3 years: train 15,000 African 
professional, send 100 senior agricul-
tural experts, set up 10 special agri-
cultural centres, build 30 malaria 
prevention centres, dispatch 300 
youth volunteers, and increase the 
number of scholarships for African 
students from 2,000 to 4,000 per 
year. 
Infrastructure 
▪ build an African Union conference 
centre 
▪ build 100 rural schools 
▪ build 30 hospitals 
 Financial commitments 
▪ provide US$ 10 billion in conces-
sional loans 
▪ provide US$ 1 billion for African 
small and medium size business 
▪ cancel debt associated with 
interest-free government loans 
due to mature by the end of 2009 
Trade and investment 
▪ duty-free and quota-free treat-
ment for 95% of products from 
African LDCs 
Capacity building 
▪ launch China-Africa science and 
technology partnership, carry out 
100 joint demonstration projects 
on science and technology re-
search and receive 100 African 
post-doctoral fellows in China. 
▪ train 20,000 professionals in 
various fields 
▪ increase the number of agricul-
tural demonstration centres to 20, 
send 50 agricultural technology 
teams, and train 2,000 agricultur-
al experts 
▪ launch a China-Africa joint re-
search and exchange programme. 
▪ build 50 China-Africa friendship 
schools and train 1,500 school 
principals; increase government 
scholarships to Africa to 5,500 
within 3 years. 
  
Source: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 
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Having a much-longed-for business partner instead of a 
donor, requires African actors engage with these partners 
at the level of business, not aid. In this setting, African 
states will need to focus their demands towards China and 
engage more in a business and market rationale.  
Institutionalised follow-up committees should be 
established in participating countries‘ administrations — 
and at regional level. These committees could assess the 
different commitments (related to trade, investments and 
aid), supervise implementation and seek solutions wherever 
difficulties or conflicting interests occur.  
Coordination at regional level in Africa should be improved. 
African policymakers should coordinate, in order to make 
cooperation fruitful to individual countries and to regional 
communities. Beijing‘s increasing interest in regional 
organisations could, for instance, be channelled to support 
regional action plans.     
 
Given the diversity of African actors, the inclusiveness of 
engagement should increase; inviting academics, civil 
society, and NGOs to debates during FOCAC V would be of 
great importance for China and Africa for a number of 
political reasons. There have been individual attempts thus 
far to bring think tanks and business into the discussion 
around FOCAC; these need to be broadened. Only by 
including a wider range of actors can an China-Africa 
economic partnership and cooperation become politically 
sustainable and innovative.  
 
 Dr Sven Grimm 
 Director  
Centre for Chinese Studies 
 Stellenbosch University 
  




Box 1: Overview over the historical development of China-Africa relations 
Following the initial foundation of the People‘s Republic of China in 1949, the country was committed to ‗revolutionary inter-
nationalism‘ and supported Nkrumah‘s Ghana and movements such as UNITA in Angola or the Pan-African Congress (PAC) in 
South Africa. After Beijing broke ties with Moscow in 1959, China‘s engagement in Africa rivalled the West and the Soviet 
Union, yet with fewer resources. Setbacks to China-Africa relations occurred with either the toppling of African partner re-
gimes – Ghana‘s Kwame Nkrumah ironically was overthrown while on a visit to China in 1966 – or with the emergence of 
more successful political movements than the ones Beijing supported across Africa. Domestic turmoil in China after a dramat-
ically failed ‗Great Leap forward‘ in the late 1950s, and a subsequent large-scale famine in China, added to a slowing down of 
interactions.   
China‘s relations with African states re-emerged in the early 1970s, after the People‘s Republic of China was voted into the 
United Nations (UN) as the sole representative of China. The replacement of the Taiwan-based Guomindang government 
with Beijing, including in the UN Security Council, was mainly due to the high number of African votes in favour of Mainland 
China‘s inclusion in the UN General Assembly. Yet again, however, internal problems during the ‗Cultural Revolution‘ in China 
and the death of Premier Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong detracted Beijing‘s attention away from Africa. The political focus after 
Mao, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, was on (re-)building the Chinese economy. Catering for Chinese internal needs, 
international engagement in the developing world was scaled down, even though the relationships never came to a complete 
standstill. Throughout those years (and to date), Chinese medical teams, for instance, have been sent to African countries.  
Deng‘s successful strategy resulted in the continuing growth of China‘s economy after an ‗opening up‘ of the economy in the 
1980s. A consequential next step was the formulation of a ‗going out‘ policy in 1998, encouraging Chinese enterprises to seek 
activities beyond China. This engagement did not specifically focus on the African continent. Yet, Africa offered good condi-
tions for Chinese political interests. Africa‘s wealth in resources is making much of the continent economically complementary 
to an economically thriving China. Additionally, Western countries decreased their engagement in Africa throughout the 
1990s; the continent, at the time, was thus economically little contested by competitors. With internal tensions in China esca-
lating in Tiananmen in June, 1989, Beijing was criticised (and briefly shunned) by Western powers. In its diplomatic attempts 
to find allies, China turned to African states, following its historical memory of where political support could be found. Since 
the late 1990s, the Chinese foreign minister has made it a tradition to start his year with travels to African countries.  
